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SEEING IN:  TWO-FOLD, THREE-FOLD? 
Introduction 
My current research interrogates the relationship between mimetic, or representational, 
painting and digital photography and digital photographic printing through practice based research 
and I am going to take Richard Wollheim’s twofold theory of seeing-in pictures as a starting point to 
briefly touch on aspects of this here.   This paper raises a number of questions around this subject 
which I aim to answer through my on-going research. 
Richard Wollheim’s theory of ‘seeing-in’ holds that looking at pictures involves a twofold 
visual experience; between the marked surface of the picture, which he terms the configuration– and 
seeing the representing objects in this physical dimension – which he terms the recognitional. 
Originally conceiving this as two simultaneous perceptions Wollheim later reconceived this as being 
a single experience with two aspects which he termed ‘twofoldness’.1  He understood this twofold 
experience of seeing simultaneously both the physical surface of the picture and the depicting objects 
within to be a phenomenologically unique type of seeing that is irreducible and differentiated from 
what we might term ‘ordinary’ seeing of objects in everyday life. A number of theorists 2 have 
challenged, or expanded on, Wollheim’s theory by noting there are added layers of complexity to the 
viewing and perception of pictures with, for instance, Regina-Nino Kurg stating that seeing-in 
comprises of a three-fold experience. 3  Kurg expands on Wollheim’s concept by drawing on 
Edmund Husserl’s theory of ‘image consciousness’ which claims seeing-in is a three-fold experience 
due to the relationship of configuration, (the physical surface / dimension); representation – the 
representing object in the surface, and figuration - the represented subject of the object.  For example 
in Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of Simone de Beauvoir the photographic paper holds the 
representing object which deviates from the real woman in many respects – the representing object is 
black and white, it has a particular size, it is static, cropped and so on. The represented subject of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, no. 3 
(1998): 
2	  See Kendal Walton, Michael Newall, Patrick Maynard, Bence Nanay, John Dilworth,  John Kulvicki, Katerina 
Bantinaki, Jerrold Levinson, Edward Winters.	  
3	  Regina-Nino Kurg, “Seeing-in as Three-Fold Experience”, Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics, 11(1) 2014, pp. 
18-26. 
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picture is de Beauvoir herself who exists outside of the picture and perceiving her as subject in the 
picture, for Kurg, therefore involves a third fold of the perceptual experience. 
Developing his twofold theory Wollheim states that pictures comprise of representations of 
either ‘particular objects’ - for instance that the object represents a particular woman; or ‘objects of a 
particular kind’  – for instance those that represent a woman.  He cites Ingres Madame Moitessier as 
an example of depicting a ‘particular object’ and Manet’s La Prune as an example of the depiction of 
an ‘object of a particular kind’.  Kurg wonders if the difference between these depicting objects adds 
yet another fold into the perceptual experience, and I will touch on what happens when these are 
combined in one picture shortly. Nevertheless, regardless of the status of the object, for Wollheim 
seeing-in remains a twofold experience. 
 Kendal Walton expanded on Wollheim’s theory by claiming we do not actually perceive the 
subject of the picture but we imagine perceiving the subject: ‘The viewer imagines seeing a fire 
engine as she looks as a picture of one, imagining her actual visual experience to be of a fire 
engine.’4  As this second stage involves imagination and not perception Walton’s position remains 
anchored to a two-fold experience of perception.  
However Walton’s statement would appear to relate to paintings and other mediated pictures 
because with regard to photographs he states that we are in direct contact with the objects in the 
picture and because of this we directly perceive them: ‘A mechanical connection with something, 
like that of photography, counts as contact, whereas a humanly mediated one, like that of painting, 
does not.’5  From this I take it that, for Walton, there are different perceptual experiences with 
photographic subjects and painted subjects; the former involving direct perceptual access to the 
subject, the latter involving imagining perceiving the subject.  
Wollheim also sees differences between seeing-in paintings and seeing-in photographs.  He 
notes that ‘the sitter / model distinction, which holds for paintings does not hold for photographs.’6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Kendall Walton, "Depiction, Perception, and Imagination: Responses to Richard Wollheim," Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60, no. 1 (2002): 27. 
5	  Kendall Walton, "Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism," Critical Inquiry 11 (1984): 
246- 277.	  
6 Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects: With Six Supplementary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980): 208. 
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Madame Moitessier’s twin may have sat for the painted portrait and the representing object can still 
be Moitessier herself.  If her twin had sat for a photograph the representing object would be her twin.  
Kurg notes Husserl defines the distinction as that which is ‘non-positing’ depiction, for example a 
painted portrait of an imaginary person, and a ‘positing’ depiction, a portrait of an actual person, 
where positing comes from a physical object and non-positing is imagined. 7 
It is clear that there is a difference between photographs and paintings with regard to the 
nature of their representing objects. Photographs can only comprise of ‘particular objects’, given 
these are a trace off the real, whereas paintings, given they are mediated, may comprise of either 
particular objects, or objects of a particular kind.  Because of their casual nature photographs are 
positing depictions whereas paintings do not have to be. 
 
Prompts, Cues and Clues 
Wollheim states that ‘if a picture represents something, then there will be a visual experience 
of that picture that determines that it does so.’ 8 Wollheim talks here in terms of the viewer not the 
artist / maker. The perceptual experience of the painter or photographer in making pictures is another 
issue, which cannot be covered in the scope of this paper.   He states that a ‘suitable spectator’ in 
looking at the picture will have the ‘appropriate experience’ of seeing-in.  He defines a suitable 
spectator as ‘suitably sensitive, informed, and, if necessary, suitable prompted’.  This sensibility 
must include a ‘recognitional skill for what is being presented’: 9   
Even if a spectator has the relevant recognitional skills, he may not be suitably informed 
unless he is told, thing by thing, what the picture before him represents. Without this 
information, he will not have the appropriate experience.10 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Kurg, Regina-Nino. “Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Image Consciousness, Aesthetic Consciousness, and Art” 
PhD diss., la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Fribourg en Suisse, 2014). 73-74.  
8 Richard Wollheim, "On Pictorial Representation," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56, no. 3 (1998): 
217. 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
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Ernst H. Gombrich notes: ‘the chance of a correct reading of an image is governed by three 
variables: the code, the caption and the context’, where ‘code’ refers to that in the picture which 
directs the viewer to an understanding of what it represents and where ‘context must be supported by 
prior expectations based on tradition.’ 11 This sits within of the broader context of the status of a work 
of art being defined as such through ‘…its particular historic and cultural context.’12  
If telling the viewer, ‘thing by thing’, about one of my pictures leads to greater, or different, 
understandings of it, will this affect the perceptual experience of seeing-in the work?   
Fig. 1 shows an artwork I created. 
It is a physical object – A print on paper. 
Its dimensions are 90cm x 66.67 cm. 
Its title is Art Students in the Studio: Alek 
It is a Digital Photographic print on Epson enhanced matt paper. 
Oil paint was used in the creation of the work. 
The picture comprises of - Oil paint on Digital Photographic print on Epson enhanced matt paper. 
One part of the picture is painted. 
That the whole figure of Alek is painted. 
Does an altered understanding, a greater awareness, of how the picture was made – its 
productive activity - alter the perceptual experience of seeing-in? What is happening between the 
awareness of the physical mediation of the painted component in contrast to the sense of immediacy 
of the photograph? Early sampling of viewer engagement with this work around the point of 
revelation would seem to indicate different experiences for each individual; ranging from no 
perceptible difference in how the picture looks, to the figure hovering off the image, to the figure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Ernst H. Gombrich, The Image and the Eye: Further Studies in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation. 
(Ithaca: Cornell UP 1982):142. 
12	  Stefan Deines,"Art in Context: On cultural limits to the understanding, experience and evaluation of works of 
art" in Gimme Shelter: Global Discourse in Aesthetics, ed. De Mul, Jos. and Van de Vall, Renee.  (International year Book 
of Aesthetics. Vol. 15. 2011): 24.	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oscillating on the image surface whilst the photographic ‘background’ remains static.  As we would 
expect each viewer has a uniquely phenomenological experience in seeing the work.   
Not only does Wollheim understand that viewers, when looking at pictures, move around 
them and see them from various angles, he sees doing this as supporting his twofold theory. Anne 
Tuscher says, ‘In Wollheim's opinion, one major consideration in favour of  "twofoldness" is that it 
yields an explanation of the perceptual constancy phenomenon’13 – that is that as the viewer moves 
around a picture perception of the image remains constant, (that, for instance, perspective in the 
picture does not warp), due to a simultaneous awareness of the picture’s surface and its content.   
The viewer performs perceptual adjustments to the objects that sit ‘in-depth’ in the picture by 
maintaining an awareness of these at right angles to the perpendicular surface.  There must be 
simultaneous perception of the surface and depth in the picture for this to happen.  This complex 
theory enters into psychophysics.  
However I believe Wollheim does not fully acknowledge the degree to which the actively 
dynamic act of viewing pictures enriches the perceptual experiences of seeing them.14 When looking 
at pictures we move close, then away, then closer still, to one side and another; we peer and squint in 
order to inspect the object under examination, in order to better understand it.15 Why does the viewer 
lean forward when aware that part of the picture is painted?  In order to better concentrate, focus and 
see it and, from that, better perceive it.  An active interrogation of the picture as physical object, and 
from this the depicting objects and depicted subjects within, must develop perceptual experience of 
the picture. In order to see in the picture in any meaningful way it helps to understand what type of 
picture it is we are engaging with.  
This raises the question as to what degree, or in what way, does an understanding, or 
misunderstanding of, and expectations placed on, the pictures before the viewer affect the perceptual 
experience of engaging with them?  Does an understanding that what is looked at is a painting rather 
than, say, a photograph affect the perceptual experience of seeing-in?  Is the way in which the viewer 
imagines seeing the depicted subject of the painting different to the way in which the viewer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Anne Tüscher, “Seeing-in Theory of Depiction and the Psychophysics of Picture Perception." Accessed 
November 15, 2016. http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_00000071 
14 See Patrick Maynard, "Seeing Double," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52, no. 2 (1994): 157 
15 Fig. 2,3,4 
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imagines seeing the subject of the photograph, whether we argue photographs are ‘transparent’ or 
‘representations’? 
We are conscious that when standing in front of a painting we are looking at a mediated 
picture.  We intuit that when looking at a photograph we are perceiving more directly the objects in 
the picture.  Surely our perceiving one is different to perceiving the other as, at the very least, in one 
we are more conscious of the intentionality of production.  
Can there be a single phenomenological perceptual experience of seeing-in a picture that 
comprises of both paint and photograph, or is it necessary to perceptually move between them in 
order to engage with one then the other?   Physically standing back enables seeing a unified whole 
that is a single experience of seeing-in the picture, (whether twofold or threefold), and moving closer 
enables an engagement with the physicality, the surface qualities, of the medium(s).  This is 
necessary to enable a fuller perception of what is being looked at and, I believe, is one of a number 
of ways of perceiving pictures.  Dominic Lopes states: 
An adequate theory of depiction should explain the full range of our experience of pictures 
including those which are twofold, those which require a shift in attention from content to 
design and back again, and those rare pictures whose contents we experience even when 
their designed surfaces are not visible.16 
 
The ‘rare pictures’ Lopes refers to here include those such as trompe l’oeil paintings – that ‘deceive 
the eye’ - and to which I will refer shortly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Dominic Lopes, Understanding Pictures, Clarendon Press, Oxford quoted in Seeing-in Theory of Depiction 
and the Psychophysics of Picture Perception." Anne Tüscher. Accessed November 15, 2016. 
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn_0000007 
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Surfaces -Walls. 
Photographs must always be of ‘particular objects’, which come directly from that which sits 
outside of the picture.17  Paintings may be either of ‘particular objects’ or ‘objects of a particular 
kind’ and I will briefly look at this relationship in two pictures of mine. 
Fig. 5 shows a digital print of photographed paint marks, found on a studio wall, with actual 
paint marks that I have applied to the physical picture.   The photographed paint marks are specific, a 
by-product of another painting activity in a studio, and unrepresentative of anything other than what 
they are in themselves.  This is a photograph of these ‘particular objects’.  My intention when 
painting other marks onto the photographic print is for these to mimic the photographed marks, or 
rather the type of marks photographed, already present in the photographic image.18  Therefore, in 
this picture, unlike the photographed marks, the marks I paint onto the surface, because they do not 
re-present specific paint marks but represent the type of photographed paint marks in the photograph 
therefore represent ‘objects of a particular kind’.  
The physically applied mark that I have painted on the print not only exists in its own right 
but also, simultaneously, as representing an identical paint mark in the context of the photographic 
marks.  This is also true of the object that is the photographed paint mark with its subject bound up in 
it yet simultaneously absent. Is there a difference in the perceptual experience of seeing the 
physically painted mark’s object / subject relation compared to the photographed paint marks object / 
subject relation?   Would Walton have it that in perceiving the physically painted mark the viewer 
imagines perceiving the type of mark this represents, whilst having direct perceptual access the 
photographed marks? Added to this, as noted above, does the awareness of the physical mediation of 
the painted elements, its productive activity, in contrast to the immediacy of the photograph of the 
picture, play a part in adding to the perceptual experience or does this force a perceptual shift 
between one and the other?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See Canhui Zhang, Hans Rainer. Sepp, and Kwok-ying Lau, Kairos: Phenomenology and Photography (Hong 
Kong: Edwin Cheng Foundation Asian Centre for Phenomenology, Research Institute for Humanities, Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, 2009). 
18 Fig. 6 
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Fig. 7 shows another painted-on digital photographic print.  Here we have the photographed 
paint marks  - photographed ‘particular objects’ – painted on marks that are of the type of 
photographed paint marks – painted ‘objects of a particular kind’ – and painting of particular pieces 
of masking tape – painted ‘particular objects’.  Do these differences add further layers to the 
perceptual experience of seeing in the picture, or are these bound up collectively as objects seen as 
one in the surface allowing a unified perceptual experience? 
I believe that because of the highly mimetic nature of the painted elements within them these 
pictures combine into aesthetically unified wholes that can also be viewed separately. This demands 
a particular viewing experience; one that is about differentiated seeing. This differentiation lies in 
both a perceptual shift back and forth between that which is painted and that which is photographic, 
and containing the painted and photographic elements as a single whole.  The former, that is 
perception of the physical qualities of the mediums, is achieved by coming physically close to the 
work, and the latter, that is seeing-in the picture as unified whole, by standing back from it.  Both 
these activities are necessary in order to gain a fuller perceptual experience of the picture. 
 
Trompe l’oeil 
As a mimetic project, in its imitation of the ‘real’, the painting hides itself within and 
‘through’ the photograph, and, at the same time, it draws attention to itself as artifice. This moves 
into aspects of trompe l’oeil, that is, a ‘deception of the eye’.  Wollheim holds that trompe l’oeil, 
because it denies the surface of the picture and fools the viewer into thinking the representing object 
is the actual object, is not representational.  Where the viewer cannot perceive the surface there can 
be no twofoldness between surface and the depicting objects within.   He states, ‘[Some] paintings 
are non-representational . . . because they do not invoke, indeed they repel, attention to the marked 
surface. Trompe l’oeil paintings are surely in this category.’19   However Wollheim fails to take into 
account that trompe l’oeil only truly ‘works’ when the deception is revealed.  This revelation brings 
about a forcible perception of the surface of the picture, which must lead to a heightened twofold 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Richard Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 62, quoted in "Pictorial Experience and Seeing - University of Kent," 
accessed November 15, 2016, https://kar.kent.ac.uk/31630/1/Newall, 'Pictures and Seeing'.pdf. 
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experience of the whole.  I anticipate that a trompe l’oeil revelation with my pictures will heighten 
the sense of surface qualities that potentially bring about a closer engagement for the viewer with the 
work and heighten the sense of difference between the two mediums of paint and photography whilst 
at the same time reinforcing representational similarities. It is anticipated that through this 
heightened awareness in the act of viewing a heightened awareness of the historical dimension of the 
work in its making and the present dimension of the work’s formal qualities is made. Caroline 
Levine states: 
In the case of trompe l'oeil art, painting proclaims not only that it is a being-for-another, but 
that it is also a being-in-itself, an object in its own right that differentiates itself from nature. 
By flaunting the skill of the artist, parading its capacity to imitate the real, the picture, while 
looking very much like the reality it represents, actually compels us to recognize its status as 
painting.20 
I agree with Levine that trompe l’oeil ‘prompts a particular narrative of ‘spectatorial 
experience’21 in that here the splitting of paint and photograph creates a reflective experience for the 
viewer bound up in a set of responses between what constitutes the picture, that is the photographic 
and painted, and self. I would argue this reinforces for the viewer the performative nature of looking 
and perceiving. For Levine, “The self-reflexive character of … trompe l'oeil urges us to reflect on the 
production of representation and trompe l'oeil is, therefore, the critical art par excellence.” 22  Rather 
than denying twofoldness trompe l’oeil, at the point of revelation, emphatically reinforces this 
perceptual experience. 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Caroline Levine, “Seductive Reflexivity: Ruskin’s Dreaded trompe l’oeil,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 56, no. 4 (1998): 368.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 	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                                                   ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
                                           Fig. 1. 
Carl Robinson, Art Students in the Studio: Alek, 2016, Oil on Digital Photographic Print on Epson Enhanced 
            Matt Paper, 90 cm x 66.67 cm 
 
 
                                             Fig. 2. 
   Viewing Art Students in the Studio: Alek, at Backlit studios Nottingham, November, 2016 
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                                          Fig. 3. 
               Viewing Art Students in the Studio: Alek, at Backlit studios Nottingham, November, 2016. 
 
 
 
                                             Fig. 4. 
   Viewing Art Students in the Studio: Alek, at Backlit studios Nottingham, November, 2016. 
 
 
	   13	  
 
                             
                                                                        Fig. 5. 
Carl Robinson, Surfaces, Walls (i) 2016, Gouache on Digital Photographic Print on Epson Enhanced Matt 
Paper, 66.5 cm x 90 cm 
 
  
                                                                 Fig. 6. 
Carl Robinson, Surfaces, Walls (i) 2016, Digital Photographic Print on Epson Enhanced Matt Paper, prior to 
painting, 66.5 cm x 90 cm 
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                                                                            Fig. 7. 
Carl Robinson, Surfaces, Walls (vii) 2016, Oil and Gouache on Digital Photographic Print on Epson Enhanced 
Matt Paper, prior to painting, 66.5 cm x 90 cm 
 
 
     Photographed ‘particular objects’ 
                                                         Painted ‘objects of a particular kind’ 
                                                                                                                           Painted ‘particular objects’
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